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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In March 1990, the Town of Springdale adopted the Uniform
Fire Code ("UFC") and Tables III of the UFC.

(R. 645, 11.

20-23).
Section 10.301© of the UFC gives the Fire Chief almost
unlimited discretion to determine the water flow and the
number of hydrants for any building he approves. It also
allows the Fire Chief to use Tables III-A and III-B to set
fire hydrant requirements. See §10.301© of the UFC attached
to Appellants Brief as Exhibit "C".
Fire Chief Bench ("Bench") elected to use Tables III-A and
III-B for cross-appellee's fire hydrant requirements of
2,750 g.p.m. from three fire hydrants,

(R.656, 11. 2-13)

and never used his discretion to raise Table III-A water
flow requirements. (R. 658, 11. 13-15).
On July 13, and again on August 15, 1991, Bench placed a
red-tag on cross-appellee's building for among other things
not providing adequate water flow from cross-appellee's fire
hydrant system. (R. 49).
On November 1, 1991, Bench conducted a water flow test to
determine if cross-appellee's fire hydrant system met the
requirements of Table III-A of the UFC, and reported the
results of the test in a letter dated December 10, 1991.
(R. 63) .
The November 1, 1991, test showed that the fire hydrant
system water flowed 3,210 gpm.

1

However, Bench claimed the

results of the test showed that the system was not adequate
for safe fire fighting capabilities because the test showed
that hydrant #3 had only 1/090 g.p.m. water flow available
to it.

Id.

Before Bench would lift the red-tag from cross-appellee's
building, he required that the petitioner make inoperative
it's #3 fire hydrant and 200 feet of supply line.

(R. 49

15 and R. 67).
The #3 fire hydrant was placed in a location that not only
provided

needed

fire

protection

to

Petitioner's

new

building, but was also placed in that location to provide
fire protection for a new motel building that was planned.
(R. 49 16).
On June 10, 1992, cross-appellee filed a Rule 65B Petition
seeking extraordinary relief

(Civil No. 920500615CV) to

review the November 1, 1991, test results and determine if
the results show that the fire hydrant system is not
adequate for safe fire fighting capabilities. (R. 78)
On July 1, 1992, the cross appellee filed an Amended
Petition for extraordinary relief. Id.
On August 31, 1993, cross-appellee filed a Second Amended
Rule

65(B)

Petition

for

extraordinary

relief

listing

Rockville-Springdale Fire Protection District as Respondent.
The petition alleged that Bench abused his discretion when
he found that the November 1, 1991, water flow results

2

showed that the hydrant system was not adequate for safe
fire fighting capabilities. (R. 49 17 and 78).
On December 15, 1993, the cross-appellant filed a Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Civil No. 920500615CV),
wherein on page 4 he said "If the aggrieved party is still
adamant about seeking review of a Fire Chief's decision, the
aggrieved party may file for extraordinary relief under Rule
65B in a District Court to have the fire Chief's decision
reviewed."

(R. 69-71).

On January 7, 1994, the cross-appellant

filed a Reply

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, wherein on pages
3-4 he said "this Court should inquire whether the Fire
Chief abused his discretion."

(R. 73-76).

On March 9, 1994, the trial court in finding the "Fire
District" was not a proper party to the action, said "it is

within the exclusive discretion

of the Fire Chief to decide

finally how the Fire Code will be applied in any particular

case and it

is his

discretion

which would be subject

review under Rule 65B, not the advisory
Board."

opinion

of the

to
Fire

The court dismissed the Petition with prejudice.

(Emphasis added) (R. 78-79).
On March 19, 1994, the cross-appellee filed among other
things a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement. (R. 82).
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16.

On May 9, 1994, oral argument came before the trial court
and Paul G. McMillin, filed a Minute Entry that reads as
follows:
"(4:22) This case is before Judge J. Philip Eves for hearing
on Petitioner's Motion for Clarification, Alter or Amend
Judgment and leave to Amend Petition. . . . Mr. Stirba
is
heard in response, indicates that the case has already been
decided, and Mr. West either
appeal or file
a new case.
.
. . Mr. West's Motion to Amend for extraordinary
relief
is
denied.
If he so desires,
Mr. West is to file
a claim
against Al Bench, but it must be a new and separate
case if
he wants further
relief.
. . . (emphasis added) (R. 82) .

17.

On May 10, 1994, the cross-appellee followed the direction
of the court and filed a new Petition for extraordinary
relief (Civil No. 940500723CV) listing Al Bench, as former
Fire Chief, as Respondent. (R. 1-3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. CROSS-APPEAL
Before Bench would remove two red-tags from cross-appellee's

building, he required cross-appellee's #3 fire hydrant and 200
feet of supply line to be made inoperative because he claimed
that the November 1, 1991, water flow test showed that the fire
hydrant

system

was

not

adequate

for

safe

fire

capabilities as long as hydrant #3 was operative.

fighting

(R. 2, 15).

A case becomes moot when the judicial relief requested cannot
affect

the rights of the litigants.

Bennion v. Sundance

Development Corporation, 897 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995).

Table

III-B of the UFC gives the cross-appellee the right to have three
or more fire hydrants to protect his building.

4

Cross-appellee

installed four fire hydrants around his building.

Four hydrants

equally spaced around a building give more protection than three
hydrants.

The cross-appellee paid a considerable amount of money

for hydrant #3 and 200 feet of supply line for protection of its
new 12,000 square foot building and cross-appellee has a right
to have and to use that added fire protection.

Therefore, there

is an actual controversy between the parties and the case is not
moot.
On June 10, 1992, cross-appellee filed a Rule 65(B) Petition
seeking extraordinary relief (Civil No. 920500615CV) to review
the November 1, 1991, test results. (R. 78). On March 9, 1994,
the trial court dismissed this cause of action with prejudice
holding the Fire District was not the proper party to the action,
stating,
"it is within the exclusive discretion of the Fire Chief
to decide finally how the Fire Code will be applied in any
particular case and it is his discretion
which would be
subject
to review under 65B, not the advisory opinion of the
Fire Board." (emphasis added)(R. 78-79).
On March 19, 1994, among other things the cross-appellee
made a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement. (R.
82).

50, 512 and R.

On May 9, 1994, in the courts Minute Entry the court denied

this motion and said,
"If he so desires, Mr. West is to file a claim against Al
Bench, but it must be a new and separate case if [he] wants
further relief." (R. 82).
The court directed the cross-appellee to file a new Petition with
Bench listed as the Respondent.
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The next day on May 10, 1994,

the cross-appellee followed the direction of the court and filed
a new Petition for extraordinary relief (Civil No. 940500723CV)
listing Al Bench, as former Fire Chief, as Respondent. (R. 1-3) .
The cross-appellant argues that an appeal

of the courts

ruling denying Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement
would have been a plain, adequate and speedy remedy within the
meaning of Utah R. CIV. P. 65B(a) and therefore, the crossappellee placed itself out of the reach of an extraordinary writ
when it did not file an appeal.

However, an appeal under these

circumstances would not have been a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law within the meaning of Utah R. CIV. P. 65B(a),
because it was faster, and less expensive to follow the Court's
direction

and

file

a new

action.

Furthermore, both

the

Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Bench should have been
named as Respondent rather than the Fire District.
ARGUMENT
I. CROSS-APPEAL
A.

THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITION ARE NOT MOOT THEREFORE,
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR WHEN IT DENIED THE CROSSAPPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT THE CASE
WAS MOOT.
In an effort to open its new restaurant the cross-appellee

made the #3 fire hydrant and its 200 feet of supply line
inoperative as directed to do so by Bench.

The fact that

Petitioner is currently in compliance with the Uniform Fire Code
is irrelevant to the issue of whether or not petitioner's claims
are moot, because the cross-appellee claimed that it's fire

6

protection system was in compliance with the Uniform Fire Code
prior to making its #3 fire hydrant inoperative.

(R. 2 at $4) .

A case becomes moot when the judicial relief requested
cannot affect the rights of the litigants.

Bennion v. Sundance

Development Corporation, 897 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995).

If in

fact Bench "abused his discretion" when he found that the
November 1, 1991, water flow test showed that the fire hydrant
system was not adequate for safe fire fighting capabilities, then
cross-appellee in fact loses his right to use his #3 fire hydrant
and 200 feet of supply for fire protection.

Table III-B of the

UFC gives the cross-appellee the right to have three or more fire
hydrants to protect his building.

Cross-appellee installed four

fire hydrants around his building. Four hydrants equally spaced
around a building give more protection than three hydrants.

The

cross-appellee paid a considerable amount of money for hydrant
#3 and 200 feet of supply line for protection of its new 12,000
square foot building and cross-appellee has a right to have and
to use that added fire protection.

Therefore, there is an actual

controversy between the parties.
The cross-appellant argues,
"Of utmost importance to this issue is the fact that Al
Bench is no longer the Fire Chief or Fire Marshall.
Therefore, any order directing him to perform any action
would have no effect and as he is no longer in any position
of authority. Moreover, the Fire Protection District under
which Al Bench served as Fire Chief is not a party to the
action below."
However, the Rule 65B Petition for extraordinary relief filed by
cross-appellee did not ask the court to direct Bench or the Fire
7

District to do anything.

Concerning the issues before it, the

court said,
THE COURT: "Once again let me explain what I view as the
issues. And I'm taking these directly from the petitioner's
Petition for Extraordinary Relief. To determine if the
water flow test conducted on November [1], 1991, showed that
the petitioner's fire protection system did not comply with
Table A III-A(l) . . . . Number two, to determine if the
test showed that the system was not adequate . . . safe fire
fighting capabilities.
And number three, to specify
specifically whether hydrant three was a dangerous hydrant."
(R. 922-923) .
If the court found that Bench had abused his discretion in
finding that the test results showed that the system was unsafe,
there wouldn't be anything that Bench or the Fire District needed
to do to make the #3 fire hydrant operative.
B.

THE CROSS-APPELLEE DID NOT HAVE ANOTHER PLAIN, ADEQUATE AND
SPEEDY REMEDY.
On June 10, 1992, cross-appellee filed a Rule 65(B) Petition

seeking extraordinary relief (Civil No. 920500615CV) to review
the November 1, 1991, test results. (R. 78)

On March 9, 1994,

the trial court dismissed this cause of action with prejudice
holding among other things that,
"it is within the exclusive discretion
of the Fire Chief to
decide finally how the Fire Code will be applied in any
particular case and it is his exercise
of discretion
which
would be subject
to review under Rule 65B, not the advisory
opinion of the Fire Board. . . Accordingly, the Petition
is ordered dismissed upon the alternative ground that the
Respondent, [Rockville-Springdale Fire Protection District]
is not a proper party to the action." (emphasis added)(R.
78-80).
On March 19, 1994, among other things the cross-appellee
made a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement. (R.50, 512 and R. 82).
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On May 9, 1994, in the court's Minute Entry the court denied this
motion and said,
"If he so desires, Mr. West is to file a claim against Al
Bench, but it must be a new and separate case if [he] wants
further relief." (R. 82).
The court directed the cross-appellee to file a new Petition with
Bench listed as the Respondent.

The next day on May 10, 1994,

the cross-appellee followed the direction of the court and filed
a new Petition for extraordinary relief (Civil No. 940500723CV)
listing Al Bench, as former Fire Chief, as Respondent. (R. 1-3) .
The cross-appellant argues that an appeal of the courts
ruling denying Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement
would have been a plain, adequate and speedy remedy within the
meaning of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) and therefore, the crossappellee placed itself out of the reach of an extraordinary writ
when it did not file an appeal.

This argument is in direct

conflict with what the cross-appellant argued on December 15,
1993, January 7, 1994, and on May 9, 1994. On December 15, 1993,
the cross-appellant filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss, arguing that the Fire District was not a proper party
to the action, (Civil No. 920500615CV), wherein on page 4 he
said,
"If the aggrieved party is still adamant about seeking
review of a Fire Chief's decision, the aggrieved party may
file for extraordinary relief under Rule 65B in a District
Court to have the Fire Chief's decision reviewed." (R. 6971).
On January 7, 1994, the cross-appellant filed a Reply Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Dismiss, wherein on page 3-4 he said,
9

"this Court should inquire whether the Fire Chief abused his
discretion." (R. 73-76).
On May 9, 1994, oral argument came before the trial court and
Paul G. McMillin, filed a Minute Entry that reads as follows:
"(4:22) This case is before Judge J. Philip Eves for hearing
on Petitioner's Motion for Clarification, Alter or Amend
Judgment and leave to Amend Petition. . . . Mr. Stirba is
heard in response, indicates that the case has already been
decided, and Mr. West either
appeal or file
a new case. .
. . (emphasis added)(R. 82)
There is little doubt that the cross-appellee could have
appealed the courts ruling.

However, an appeal under these

circumstances would not have been a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law within the meaning of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a),
becuase it was faster, and less expensive to follow the Court's
direction

and

file

a new

action.

Furthermore, both

the

Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Bench should have been
named as Respondent rather than the Fire District.
C.

RELIEF UNDER RULE 65B(e) CAN BE GRANTED WHERE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, OR OFFICER EXERCISING JUDICIAL
FUNCTIONS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, OR WHERE A PERSON HAS
FAILED TO PERFORM AN ACT REQUIRED BY LAW AS A DUTY OF
OFFICE, TRUST OR STATION, OR AND WHERE A PERSON HAS REFUSED
THE PETITIONER THE USE OR ENJOYMENT OF A RIGHT TO WHICH THE
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED.
UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B(e) (2) (A) ,
(B)&(C).
1.

RULE 65B(e) (2) (A).

The court had the authority to review the Chief's decision
because it is the act of an administrative agency and the crossappellee alleges that the administrative agency's fire chief has
abused his discretion.
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2.

Rule 65b(e)(2)(B) and (C).

In March 1990, the Town of Springdale adopted the Uniform
Fire Code and Table III of the UFC. (R. 645, 11. 20-23).

The

Fire Chief enforces the Uniform Fire Code to make sure any fire
hydrant system is in compliance with the water flow and number
of fire hydrants required by the Chief and/or Table III-A and
III-B of the UFC.

See §10.301 (C) of the UFC attached to

Petitioner's Brief as Exhibit T ' ,

Fire Chief Bench elected to

use Tables III-A and III-B for cross-appellee's fire hydrant
requirements of 2,750 g.p.m. out of three hydrants, (R. 656, 11.
2-13)

and never used his discretion to raise Table III-A

requirements. (R. 658, 11. 13-15).

The results of the water flow

test conducted on November 1, 1991, showed that the crossappellee's hydrant system water flowed 3,210 g.p.m.

(R. 63),

which is 450 g.p.m. more than what is required by Table III-A of
the

UFC.

Therefore,

compliance with the UFC.

the

cross-appellee's

system

was

in

If the system could be used with safety

with hydrant #3 operative, the fire chief had a duty to approve
the system, and the cross-appellee had a right to use its system.
The cross-appellee paid a considerable amount of money for
hydrant #3 and 200 feet of supply line.

Therefore, cross-

appellee has a right to have and to use that added fire
protection which hydrant #3 provided.
Chief Bench abused his discretion when he found that the
November 1, 1991, water flow test showed that the system was not
adequate for safe fire fighting capabilities with hydrant #3
11

operative, because his determination was not supported by a
reasonable basis.

See

Argument Issue I, Petitioner/Appellant

Brief pages 14-24.
D.

THE REVIEW SOUGHT BY PETITIONER WAS WITHIN THE SCOPE
CONTEMPLATED BY RULE 65B.
On November 1, 1991, Bench conducted a water flow test to

determine

if cross-appellee's

fire hydrant

system met

the

requirements of Table III-A of the UFC, and reported the results
of the test in a letter dated December 10, 1991. (R. 63). The
test showed that the fire hydrant system water flowed 3,210
g.p.m., 460 g.p.m. more than what Table III-A of the UFC
requires. Id.

However, Bench still claimed the results of the

test showed that the system was not adequate for safe fire
fighting capabilities. Id.
When reviewing the Fire Chief's discretionary decisions, his
findings of fact will be "accorded substantial deference and will
not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if
another conclusion from the evidence is permissible."

Hurley v.

Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 767 P.2d 524, 526-527
(Utah 1988). The cross-appellee's Rule 65B Petition asked the
court to review the Fire Chief's decision which was based on the
test results found in Bench's letter dated December 10, 1991, to
determine whether or not the November 1, 1991, test results would
support the finding that petitioner's system was not adequate for
safe fire fighting capabilities. (R. 2-3) . The Hurley

12

standard

of review as stated above can certainly be applied to the relief
sought.
In conclusion.

For the reasons set forth above, the Fifth

District Court did not err in denying respondents Motion to
Dismiss.
E.

EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EXPRESS STATUTORY PROCEDURE,
PETITIONER HAS A RIGHT OF REVIEW IMPLEMENTED THROUGH SECTION
5 OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHICH VESTS
GENERAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT.
Even in the absence of any express statutory procedure.

Petitioner has a right of review implemented through Section 5
of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution which vests general
appellate jurisdiction in the District Court. Peatross v.Board
of Corners of Salt Lake City, 555 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah).
ARGUMENT
II.
A.

IN RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF.

UNDER THE UNIFORM FIRE CODE, THE FIRE CHIEF IS GIVEN
BROAD DISCRETION IN ADMINISTERING AND ENFORCING THE
UFC.
The cross-appellee concedes Section 10.301© of the UFC gives

the Fire Chief almost unlimited discretion to determine the water
flow and the number of hydrants for any building he approves.
However, John Elder, the Chief of the Fire Prevention Bureau of
the

State

Fire

Marshal's

Office

of

the

State

of

acknowledged that the fire chief would need to be able to
his decisions based on a rational

basis.

Utah,
justify

(R. 860)

Bench was asked by his attorney to explain to the Court what
factors he relied on in reaching his conclusions set out in his
13

December 10, 1991, report.

He answered, (1) he considered the

experience of his fire fighters and found that their experience
and training were minimal; (2) he considered his equipment which
was very old and probably had seen better

years;

(3) he

considered the fact that the surrounding area, and petitioner's
building is located probably in the most congested part of town;
(4) he considered the hydrants on the other side of the street
that the town water superintendent had told him from "day one"
were very poor hydrants that could not be trusted;

(5) he

considered the Bed and Breakfast with wood-shingles next door;
(6) he considered the "mutual aid" companies that were at his
disposal; and, (7) he considered other various factors. (R. 938941) .

All these factors were known by Bench when he used

discretion

and elected to use Tables III-A and III-B of the UFC

to set petitioner's
from

a minimum

of

requirements at 2,750 gallons per minute
three

hydrants. (R. 656, 11.2-13).

testified that he never used his discretion
flow

his

requirements

of

Table

III-A.

to
(R

raise
658,

Bench

the water

11.

13-15) .

Furthermore, Bench testified that he ever required 1,000 gpm out
of hydrant #2 and #3 until December 10, 1991 which was over a
year from when the hydrants were installed.
B.

(R. 672, 11. 1-22) .

THE EVIDENCE RELIED ON BY BENCH IN REACHING HIS
CONCLUSIONS SET OUT IN HIS DECEMBER 10, 1991 LETTER
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A REASONABLE OR RATIONAL BASIS.
The cross-appellant listed the following evidence relied on

by

Bench and presented to the court:
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i.

PLACEMENT OF THE HYDRANTS,
The cross-appellant used two pages to describe the history

of the placement of the hydrants. However, the placement of the
hydrants were not relevant to the issues which were before the
court.

The court said, "the exact history of Mr. West's disputes

with Springdale officials is not relevant to the issues before
the court." See Memorandum Decision attached to appellant brief
as Exhibit "D" page one.

Concerning the issues before it, the

court said,
"Once again let me explain what I view as the issues. And
I'm taking these directly from the petitioner's Petition for
Extraordinary Relief. To determine if the water flow test
conducted on November
[1], 1991, showed that the
petitioner's fire protection system did not comply with
Table A III-A(l) . . . . Number two, to determine if the
test showed that the system was not adequate . . . safe fire
fighting capabilities.
And number three, to specify
specifically whether hydrant three was a dangerous hydrant."
(R. 922-923.)
ii.

WATER FLOW TESTS.
There was no water flow test taken in March 1991 as claimed

by

cross-appellant on page 26 of its brief, the first water flow

test was conducted on July 2, 1991, by John Elder.

The cross-

appellant claims that the water flow test made by John Elder
showed that there was insufficient flow to the hydrants, and that
the results of the test indicated that there were only 1,800
gallons per minute flowing from the two hydrants and that there
was a needed flow of 2,750 to 3,000 gallons per minute.
pp 26-27.

Id. at

However, it is not true that hydrant #2 and #3 needed

to flow 2,700 to 3,000 gallons per minute.
15

The July 2, 1991,

water flow test was not made to determine if the two hydrants met
the water flow required by Table III-A of the UFC, it was made
to

determine

if

hydrant

insignificant, and if

#3

was

dry

or

its

water

flow

the test showed hydrant #3fs water flow was

insignificant then the cross-appellee would be required to "loop
his system."

See Elder's letter dated January 27, 1991,

attached to Petitioner's Brief as Exhibit "E". Table III-A and
III-B require 2,750 g.p.m. out of three hydrants not two, and
this is why hydrant #1 was installed, and was tested on July 12,
1991, to determine if the system complied with Table III-A.
After the July 2, 1991, test was conducted, Elder did not

order

the petitioner to provide a "looped

that

system,"

when hydrant #1 was installed, it was
loop

the system.

and agreed

no longer

necessary

to

(R. 854, 11. 1-13).

The cross-appellant quotes extensively from John Elder in
an effort to show that Elder's testimony supports the court's
finding that,
"[T]he court is persuaded by the testimony of . . . John
Thorpe Elder, . . . that the fire system design installed
by Mr. West created a substantial
hazard because hydrants
two and three (both on the 6-inch line), is used
simultaneously, could not produce adequate fire flow to
support fire fighters . . . See
Memorandum Decision
attached to appellant's brief as Exhibit "D" page 7.
(emphasis added).
However, Elder
into

testified that he

consideration

he did not

have

in

the

did

exercising

know

his

what

Bench

discretion, and that

expertise to venture an opinion
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took

as

to

whether the petitioner's hydrant system was safe.

The transcript

reads,
THE COURT: "As you know of the situation, are you able to
say what he exercised or what he took into consideration in
exercising his discretion?" ELDER: "I'm not your Honor/7
THE COURT: "Okay.
Also there's an allegation in this
lawsuit that the fire hydrant number three was an unsafe
hydrant— or that it was not an unsafe hydrant even though
apparently the chief had determined that it was. . . Are you
— do you have expertise to venture an opinion on that?"
ELDER: "No". (R. 864, 11. 9-21).
If Elder has no expertise
petitioner's

hydrant

that the court could
its

finding

to

system
not

venture

was safe,

an opinion

whether

the

there should be no question

use the testimony of Elder, to

support

that Bench relied on credible supporting evidence in

making his determination that the two fire hydrants on the sixinch dead end line created a system that is not adequate

for

safe

fire fighting.
Bench said his concerns about the petitioner's system was
based on the fact,
"that with only 1,100 gallons available to both of those
hydrants at 20 PSI, that it's an either/or situation. Once
you put a pumper on each of those, it becomes . . . a very
dangerous situation." . . . (R. 717, 11. 8-12)
However, the results of the November 1, 1991, flow test will
not support bench's claim that hydrant #2 and #3 cannot water
flow more than 1,100 gpm collectively with hydrant #1 closed.
Because, Tandy and Mertens both agree, that without performing
a field test or running a computer simulated test, you can't
determine the available water flow from hydrant #2 and #3
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collectively

or

individually,

with

hydrant

#1

closed

or

restricted to less than 2,120 g.p.m.1 When Bench was asked if he
had ever run a water flow test to determine what the back two
hydrants would water flow at 20 psi with hydrant #1 closed, he
admitted that he had not. (R. 547, 11. 6-11).
results

of the November 1, 1991,

Therefore, the

flow test furnishes no

that will support Bench's claim.

evidence

If Bench was concerned what

hydrant #2 and #3 could water flow collectively with hydrant #1
closed, he should have designed such a test.
Bench stated over and over and over again that hydrants #2
and #3 could not water flow more than 1,100 g.p.m. collectively.2
However, when Bench was asked if he could determine from the
results of the water flow test conducted on November 1, 1991, the
water

flow from hydrant

#3, if

hydrant

#1 was closed, he

answered, "NO". (R. 720, 1. 23 to 721, 11.14).

Therefore, this

proves conclusively that Bench's conclusion that hydrants #2 and
#3 couldn't flow more than 1,100 g.p.m., with hydrant #1 closed,
is not supported by a reasonable basis.

See ARGUMENT, ISSUE I.,

POINT B. Petitioner/Appellant Brief page 24-28.

1.

SEE (R. 886, 11, 8-12);(R. 897, 11. 16-23);(R. 612, 1. 12 to
613, 1. 11).

2.

See (R. 546, 1. 15 to p. 547, 1. 5)[only 1,100 g.p.m.
available];R. 690, 11. 8-12)[only 1,100 g.p.m. available]; (R.
717, 11. 8-18)[only 1,100 g.p.m. available]; (R. 721, 11. 911).
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iii.

APPEALS BOARDS.
The cross-appellee appealed Bench's claim that hydrant #3fs

water flow was not adequate for safe fire fighting capabilities
to two Boards of Appeals. Bench lied to both boards when he told
them that hydrant #3fs water flow was so insufficient that it
would never register on his test equipment. (R. 112. Pla 202 and
Pla 203).

The cross-appellant admits that Bench testified before

the board that he couldn't get a reading on hydrant number three.
On page 33 of its brief it says,
"Before the board, the then Chief Bench testified that
he couldn't get a reading on hydrant number three. R.00692.

At the time of the July 12, 1991, test/ the then Chief Bench
said in regards to the test,
"[i]t really did not move it
one increment,
but we gave [it]
the benefit
of the
doubt."
R. 00693. After examining all the evidence
presented, the board chose to uphold the then Chief Bench's
findings."
However, the record shows that Bench did not make the statement
that is underlined during the July 12, 1991, test

The record

reads,
MULLEN: Mr. Bench, when we broke, you stated that on July
12, you gave — the benefit of the doubt to the readings you
took on the Pitot gauge, right? BENCH: Correct. MULLEN:
Your Honor, at this point, we'd like to play a four-minute
tape of that test with Mr. Bench calling out the reading of
the Pitot gauge. . . . MULLEN: Okay. Did you hear that
phrase there on the tape about the — BENCH: It moved one
point. MULLEN: It's not the benefit of the doubt there, is
it? BENCH: I said, "one point" But it did not quite move
one point. MULLEN: You did not say on that tape "It didn't
quite move one point," you said, "One point." BENCH: No,
I did not. No, I did not. MULLEN: One point again, right,
Mr. Bench? BENCH: That's what I said. MULLEN: Not benefit
of the doubt, right? BENCH: That's what I said. MULLEN:
The gauge starts at five, doesn't it? BENCH: As I remember
that gauge, it does start at five. MULLEN: So to move it
one point gets it up to 6, right?
BENCH: That's my
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understanding of the gauge at the time. MULLEN: And if we
were to look at Exhibit 94, the handwritten notes we saw on
Monday, we'd see that you gave that hydrant there a six,
right? BENCH: I assigned it a value of six
MULLEN:
Now, Mr. Bench, isn't it true you told the board of appeals
on July 18th — . . six days after this — that you could
not even get hydrant number three to give you a reading to
measure on your instruments? BENCH: I don't remember what
my exact words were. . . . MULLEN: Okay, Your Honor. We
have another tape, then. . . . MULLEN: Okay. That was your
voice there — "it did not measure on our readings: —
right? BENCH: — yes. . . MULLEN: And on that test, you
got a measurement of six on your Pitot gauge? BENCH: I think
we just saw me state six. MULLEN: That's right. So it did
register on the Pitot gauge — on your instruments on July
12, didn't it?. . . BENCH: Yes, it did. (R. 694-706).
The Cross-appellant made it appear that the underlined statement
was given to the board of appeals.

However, this explanation

was given to the trial court to cover up his lies to the board
of appeals concerning his test results. (R. 708).

Therefore,

when the board of appeals chose to uphold Bench's findings, all
they had was Bench's statement "it did not measure on our
readings."

Supra.

Bench finally admitted that hydrant #3 measured on his test
equipment on all of his tests. Mullen asked Bench,
MULLEN: My question was all the tests you conducted hydrant
number three registered on the Pitot gauge, didn't it?
BENCH: I don't remember if it did every one or not. . . Like
if you take a look at this, it did. It barely did. MULLEN:
Let's take a look in your deposition, if we can. Would you
take a look Page 110 in your deposition, . . I'd like you
to turn and look at . . . Line 24, . . . Q. Which test did
it move the Pitot gauge? A. It moved the Pitot gauge on all
three of the tests. (R. 707-708).
Bench tried to explain to the court why he said that hydrant
#3 did not measure on his equipment.
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He said,

"And relatively speaking, six on a scale of 200 is not
bumping the gauge. It was a figurative form of speech that
I was using to say how insignificant it was. Which I've
said through the process, that there's insignificant flow.
. ."
(R. 952-953); See also, Appellant's Brief page 33.
However, if Bench was acting in "good faith" and honestly thought
that a reading of 6 on the gauge was insufficient for safe fire
fighting, he would have told the Boards of Appeals that 6 on the
gauge shows that the hydrant was water flowing 822 gallons per
minute, and then explained why he thought 822 gallons per minute
water flow was unsafe. He wouldn't have purposely

lied

to the

Board.
On page 33-34 the cross-appellant quotes Bench as saying,
"the board members had all the information and numbers in
front of them. And I gave that same information
verbally,
as I remember it." (emphasis added).
Based on this claim the cross-appellant went on to say in
his brief,
"Contrary to the Petitioner's assertion that Al Bench is
lying, all data related to pitot gauge readings and flow
test results were provided to every appeals board and, in
fact, the water flow did not, or at best barely bumped the
pitot gauge.
The January 30, 1992, board upheld the
discretion and findings of then Chief Bench." See page 34
of cross-appellant's brief.
However, if this Court will listen to Exhibit 202, which is an
excerpt of the July 18, 1991, board of appeals hearing, you will
hear Bench being asked to give the board the results of the July
12, 1991, water flow test he conducted.

He said that he could

not because the water flow from hydrant #3 was so insufficient
that it would not register on his test equipment.
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See Trial

Exhibit 202.

Both boards of appeals upheld Bench's findings,

that hydrant #3 was unsafe, because he lied to them.
hydrant

He said

#3 would not register on his test equipment.

Both

hearings were recorded on video tapes and the cross-appellant has
copies of them.
Bench

"verbally"

I challenge the cross-appellant to find where
gave

the

test

results

to

either board

of

appeals.
iv.

SOLUTIONS OFFERED BY BENCH IN HIS DECEMBER 10, 1991, LETTER
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY A REASONABLE OR RATIONAL BASIS.
The cross-appellant said the following on page 34 of his

brief.
"As of mid-July 1990, Mr. West was aware of
alternatives that had been suggested to make his system
safe.
In the Chief Bench's December 10, 1991, letter, he
incorporated the already discussed alternatives and added
another option.
Specifically, the then Chief Bench
suggested:

1)

1)

Loop the system.

2)

Sprinkle the building.

3)

Increase
the
size
of
the
six-inch
line
sufficiently to provide 1,000 GPM to each hydrant
with the #1 hydrant flowing.

4)

Install a hydrant at the mark designated by the
District in front of the Laundromat and remove
the #3 hydrant.''

LOOP THE SYSTEM.

John Elder is the Chief of the Fire Prevention Bureau of the
State Fire Marshall's Office of the State of Utah.

When Elder

learned that hydrant #2 and #3 were installed on a six-inch dead
end supply line, he was concerned whether
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or

not

hydrant

#3

would

have

adequate

water

to

serve a pumper if hydrant #2

was being used. (R. 814, 1. 8 to 815, 1. 2 ) .
In a letter dated January 23, 1991, Elder ordered the
Fire Department to water flow hydrants #2 and #3 to determine the
available water to hydrant #3 during simultaneous use.
If

#3 is dry or the flow is insignificant,

He said

then the water line

will be run to the north and connected to the main line on the
highway, thus providing a looped
Letter

attached

system."

(emphasis added) See

to Petitioner's Brief Exhibit

"E".

Elder

conducted the test he referred to in his letter on July 2, 1991.
After the test was conducted, Elder did not order
to provide a "looped system,"
was

installed, it

and agreed

was "no longer

that

necessary

the petitioner
when hydrant #1

to loop the

system."

(R. 854, 11. 1-13).
After the flow test was conducted on November 1, 1991, Elder
was asked by Mayor Robert Ralston of the Town of Springdale, to
determine from the test results whether the petitioner's hydrant
system was in compliance with Table III-A of the UFC.

In a

letter dated February 7, 1992, Elder said,
"It would appear from the documentation sent to us, that if
2,750 gallons per minute is required for the site, and 2,120
gallons per minute is available from hydrant number one,
that only 630 gallons
per minute -would be required
from
hydrants
two and three collectively.
Since 1,090 gallons
per minute is available from either hydrants two or three,
it would appear the code requirement of 2,750 gallons per
minute has been met."
(R. 823, 1. 2 to 824,
1. 5)
(emphasis added)
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2)

SPRINKLE

THE

BUILDING.

Bench claims,
"that with only 1,100 gallons available to both of those
hydrants at 20 PSI, that it's an either/or situation. Once
you put a pumper on each of those, it becomes . . . a very
dangerous situation." . . . (R. 717, 11. 8-12)
However, a sprinkled building Table III-A of the UFC still
requires a minimum of 1,500 gallons per minute.

Therefore, the

alleged danger still remains even if the building had been
sprinkled.

Because, one 1,000 gpm rated pumper can pump up to

1,500 gpm. (R. 897, 11. 10-15)(R. 609, 11. 17-24).
3)

INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE SIX-INCH
LINE SUFFICIENTLY
TO
PROVIDE 1,000
GPM TO EACH HYDRANT WITH THE #1 HYDRANT
FLOWING.

Bench

required all of the cross-appellee's hydrants to

water flow 1,000 gpm to protect

his two 1,000 gpm rated pumpers.

See Petitioner's Brief, ARGUMENT, ISSUE I.
hydrants would not correct the problem

However, 1,000 gpm

because 1,000 gpm rated

pumpers can water flow up to 1,500 gpm. SUPRA.
4)

INSTALL A HYDRANT AT THE MARK DESIGNATED BY THE DISTRICT
FRONT OF THE LAUNDROMAT AND REMOVE THE #3 HYDRANT.

IN

If this option was chosen, this would make the dangers worse
than the dangers alleged by Bench.

This is true because of the

following reasons.
1.

1,000 gpm rated pumpers can pump up to 1,500 gpm.
Id.

2.

If hydrant #3 was removed and relocated in front of
the Laundromat both hydrant #1 and #3 would be
supplied by the main ten-inch supply line and would
receive their water before hydrant #2.
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v.

3.

The November 1, 1991, water flow test showed that with
only two hydrants flowing, hydrant #1 flowing 2,100
gpm hydrant #3 water flowed 820 gpm. (R. 63).

4.

After relocating hydrant #3, if there were two 1,000
gpm rated pumpers pumping from hydrant #1 and #3, they
would be pulling up to 3,000 gpm before hydrant #2
received its water.

5.

If during the November 1, 1991, hydrant #3 could only
water flow 820 gpm with hydrant #1 taking 2,100 gpm
first, then if hydrant #1 and #3 were taking 3,000 gpm
first, hydrant #2 would be flowing less than 820 gpm
because it is taking its water last on the six-inch
dead end supply line.

TWO HYDRANTS ON A SIX-INCH, DEAD-END LINE DO NOT CREATE A
FIRE HAZARD TO FIRE FIGHTERS IF USED SIMULTANEOUSLY, IF THE
PROPER TEST WAS TAKEN AND IT WAS SHOWN THAT THERE WAS
ADEQUATE WATER FLOW.

On page 35-36 of the Cross-Appellant's Brief he said, John
Elder,
"does not allow two hydrants to be placed on a six-inch dead
end line. This is because of the possibility of not having
enough water to pump from one hydrant while water is being
drawn or drafted from the other hydrant. This is one reason
that Mr. Elder required that Indian Village's system to be
tested. This is one of the factors that then Chief Bench
used in determining that the system was inadequate.
It is true Elder did in fact order the July 2, 1991, water
flow test to determine if hydrant #3fs water flow was sufficient
to use when hydrant #2 was flowing. However, Bench could not use
this

fact as a factor in determining that the system was

inadequate. Because, after the test showed that the two hydrants
water flowed 1,800 gpm, (R. 501, 11. 1-11) Mr. Elder did not
order the petitioner to loop his system, and agreed that when
hydrant #1 was installed it was no longer necessary to loop the
system. Supra.

Whether or not the cross-appellant likes it or
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not cross-appellee passed Elder's test/ the only test that was
designed to determine whether the six-inch system was adequate
for safe fire fighting. (R.547/ 11. 6-11).
On page 37 of the Cross-Appellant's brief he tries to
insinuate that Mertens thought that the results of the November
I, 1991, water flow test as reported in Bench's letter dated
December 10/ 1991, showed that the water flow would only be able
to adequately

fight a "normal" fire.

The cross-appellant

deliberately took the work "normal" out of context.

Actually

Mertens said the following concerning the results of the November
1, 1991/ water flow test:
"Q. Now Mr. Mertens/ if we took the Indian Village system,
and we considered it to be only these three hydrants/ —
three, two and one— and excluded the rest of them, based
on Mr. Bench's calculations for November 1st — 820 gallons
per minute out of number three at 43 PSI, 2/120 out of
number one — would these tree hydrants constitute an
adequate and safe system for fire fighting? A. Yes, It's
more than adequate
without even opening number two and
without even taking number three down to 20 PSI. This test
already shows it's adequate." (R. 566, 11. 20 to R. 567/
11. 5). . . Q. Okay. Now, the 2,750 gallon requirement that
the code has in Table III — is that — a minimum amount
that's necessary? Is that for fighting
a large fire or a
small fire?
Can you tell us about that? A. That table has
been developed from tables over time and represents what you
would consider the maximum you'd ever need.
Because what
that number figures is that . . your building is completely
involved. You're using as many hoses on that building to
surround it as possible.
And so it's . . the
worst
condition.
Q. . . is there anything you could call a noxTnal
fire that you might be fighting? A. Yes. It's . . when
an engine company or fire department shows up at a fire,
they're normally seeing a fire which is — especially the
downtown area — is discovered and called in, and they're
finding that they might have a room involvement, or it may
have spread to the second room. Q. And can you give us an
estimate of . . what percentage
of the 2,750 gallons per
minute would be needed to suppress that type of a fire at
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Indian Village? . . A. I would say that on your response to
that type of fire, you would be using [no] more than 500
gallons per minute, (R. 576, 1. 10 to 579, 1. 19).
On page 35-40 the cross-appellant agues that because, two
hydrants are on installed on a six-inch dead end line, this
automatically causes the system to be inadequate without water
flow testing the system or regardless of what the test results
show.

The trial court asked the following questions to Mr.

Mertens concerning the hydrants installed on the six-inch dead
end line:
"COURT. Assume that you're faced with the circumstances that
. . when the fire chief comes on the site, he finds this
system installed in the configuration
that you see? A.
Exactly as installed, I would say that then he would run a
test just to make sure he delivers 2,750 [gpm] and make sure
he has sufficient number. And he's overprotected
both in
number and flow. COURT. How does one properly run the test
to determine whether you have flow of 2,750? A. You can
open up .. any of the hydrants. And the way it is done is
if you open up one hydrant, [if] it does not have enough,
you open up a second hydrant at the same time. And if you
don't have enough, you open a third hydrant at the same
time. If you don't have enough in three, you open up a
fourth hydrant at the same time. COURT: So you draw your
conclusion that the flow was adequate from the fact that
while hydrant number one was running, hydrant number three
was open, and that together they produced more than 2,750
gallons per minute? A. Yes. I've seen several tests, and
they've all produced more than 2,750 as a combination.
Obviously if you only test number two and three alone, then
you may not get 2,750. But that's not . . how you run the
test. COURT: All right. (R. 634, 6 to R. 635, 1. 7).
The following were questions asked by Mr. Hathaway to Mr.
Mertens concerning the hydrants installed on the six-inch deadend line:
"Q. Are you familiar with the . . fire protection handbook,
Mr. Mertens? A. Very much so. . . Q. Are you aware that it
. . cautions against the use of six inch lines, particularly
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in dead end situations?
A. I know what it says about
that, yes. But [the system] can easily be calculated to
know what you have. (R. 614, 11. 13-22). Q. Mr. Mertens,
. . Would you ever design and install a new system that
consisted of 400 feet of a six-inch diameter line with two
hydrants on it? A. Yes. There's nothing wrong with it, as
long as it met the fire flow requirements. Q, . • You
would
consider
that to be
reasonable
under the
circumstances, in your designing experience?
A.
Absolutely.
And that's why I'm going to Madison tomorrow
and continue teaching how you design for minimum demands
in order to be able to meet fire flow requirements, and how
to do that. Q. And you ..consider that to be in your
prerogative, notwithstanding
[that] .. standards or
recommendations may be out there nationally; correct? A.
Well . . there's a lot of information . . which is
considered like old hat kind of — pull out of the air. .
. What [they're] referring to is . . "Well, I don't know
what [a six-inch line] is going to do." But we know what
[this six-inch line] is going to do. And you can calculate
it, and it's been calculated, and so that all is known. And
that's why I teach the hydraulic design, so that you know
what your system is capable of doing." (R. 622, 1. 8 to 623,
1. 8) .
The cross-appellant spent four pages quoting from Mr. Tandy
to show that the trial court could rely on

Tandy's

testimony

to support its finding that the court was persuaded by the
testimony

of Mr. Tandy that the

installed

by

the petitioner

fire system designed and

created

a substantial

hazard.

However, ALL of Tandy's testimony concerning the court's finding
has been marshaled

and shows that it is based on the testimony

of Bench that the results of the November 1, 1991, flow test
showed that only 1,100 gpm is available to hydrants #2 and #3
collectively with hydrant #1 closed.
ARGUMENT POINT I B and C.

See Petitioner's Brief

Tandy testified as follows:

Mr. MULLEN: Your testimony was — and correct if I'm wrong
— that you do not know what is going to happen back here
when this
[hydrant
01] is off?"
MR. TANDY:
"Let me
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rephrase it. I know that is a potentially lethal situation.
And if you're pumping from hydrant number three, and you
have an engine crew come in and begin pumping [at] capacity
or max capacity from hydrant number two, . . . it will lose
its pressure and lose its volume to the point where those
people are in a very life-threatening situation." (R. 900,
11. 12-22) See also, citations which cover similar
testimony.1
However, on cross examination, Tandy testified that he did
not know what the water flow would be from hydrants #2 and #3 if
hydrant #1 was closed without pumping from it. Hathaway asked
Tandy,
"Now, based on your experience and your flow testing and
your fire fighting, ' if hydrant number one was shut down,
would it increase the flow to hydrants number two and
three?" TANDY: I couldn't
say.
(R. 886, 11. 8-12); See
also (R. 897, 11. 16-23) ["Not without pumping It"] .
In conclusion, Tandy admits he didn't know from the November
1, 1991, test results what hydrants #2 and #3 would flow with
hydrant #1 closed without pumping from them.

Yet, ALL his

testimony is based on the assumption that hydrant #2 and #3 are
incapable of water flowing more than 1,100 gpm with hydrant #1
closed or flowing less than 2,120 gpm.

This assumption, as shown

in Petitioner's Brief ARGUMENT POINT I B, is without a reasonable
basis.

Therefore, Tandy's testimony will not support the court's

finding that Bench relied on credible supporting evidence in
making his determination that the two fire hydrants on the dead

1.

(R. 874, 11. 22-25);(R. 875, 1. 14 to 877, 1. 20);(R. 878, 1. 9
to p. 881, 1. 2);(R. 881, 1. 11 to p. 882, 1. 9);(R. 898, 11.
2-12);(R. 904, 11. 9-21);(R.907, 1. 10 to 908, 1. 5);(R. 911,
1. 18 to 912, 1. 1).
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end six-inch line created a system that is not adequate for safe
fire fighting.
vi.

BENCH CLAIMED THAT THE CODE REQUIRES YOU TO OPERATE
THE HYDRANT AT A MINIMUM OF 20 PSI BECAUSE YOU COULD
CAVITATE OR COLLAPSE THE SYSTEM.
HOWEVER, THIS
REQUIREMENT CAN'T BE FOUND IN THE UFC.
Rather than to duplicate what has already been stated in

Petitioner Brief ARGUMENT, ISSUE I, A. b. in an effort to
argue against cross-appellant's assertion that the evidence
supports

Bench's

claim that

the

cross-appellee's

system

creates a danger of cavitating the pumper or collapsing the
system, the cross-appellee directs this Court to crossappellee's brief.
Both Tandy and Mertens agree to avoid a cavitation of the
pumper or damage to the supply system, when pumping a quantity
of water that is less than the pumping capacity of the pumper,
the incoming pressure

gauge mounted on the truck must be

monitored at all times.1
true,

The cross-appellant

if you want to prevent

the

collapse

See cross-appellants brief page 41.

admits
and/or

this

is

cavitation.

Furthermore, Mertens

testified that if you properly monitor the incoming pressure
gauge, any size pumper can hook onto any hydrant and pump
whatever water is available.

(R. 572, 1. 12 to R. 573, 1. 24).

Because the cross-appellee pointed out that Bench admitted

1.

See (R. 894, 11. 4-11);(R. 569, 11. 8-18).

30

that his pumper truck had an incoming pressure gauge, but didn't
know if it worked or whether it was accurate, and that none of
his fire fighters were trained to operate the gauge, (R. 949, 11.
2-17)

the

cross-appellant

made

the

following

ridiculous

statement:
"They must make do with what they have, an unreliable gauge
and a volunteer fire department. While Petitioner argues
that this is dangerous, it is the only system that was
available to then Chief Bench." Cross-Appellant's Brief p.
41.
Bench's solution for a gauge, that doesn't work, is not to
replace or repair the gauge, but is to require all of the crossappellee's hydrants to water flow 1,000 gpm to protect

his two

1,000 gpm rated pumpers. However, 1,000 gpm hydrants would not
correct the problem that is caused by a gauge that doesn' t work,
because 1,000 gpm rated pumpers can water flow up to 1,500 gpm.
Supra.

Furthermore, with a gauge that doesn't work, how would

Bench use with safety the hydrants in town he said he did not
trust, fearing that they could break if too much water was drawn
from them.

Bench said the following concerning these hydrants:

"On the other side of the street, there was an old existing
water and hydrant system. . . It was on an old four
inch
line.
. . The town water superintendent told me from the
very early goings in my being fire chief, that the water
line and the hydrants on that side of the street were very
poor. In fact, the line could not be trusted. It — could
break if there was too much drown out of., those hydrants.
And the . . hydrants later when we flowed them showed . .
how poor they really were. They . . would not move the
Pitot
gauge at all.
But I knew that
those
were bad
hydrants,
from day one." (R. 939-940).
Concerning the poor hydrants, Mullen asked Bench,
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"Q. But you told me you had a fire hydrant across the street
that . . wouldn' t even register
on the Pitot gauge, right?
A. Correct.
Q. And that's a hydrant for the Town of
Springdale; correct? A. Not one I would use. (R. 543-544).
However, the cross-appellant admitted in his foot note number ten
on page 30 of his brief, that in fact Mr. Bench used the hydrant
across the street to approve a permit for a T-shirt shop.

If

this hydrant was used with Bench's pumper with a gauge that
didn't work, why wouldn't it cavitate his pumper or collapse the
system?
Concerning the statement made by Bench that none of his fire
fighters have been trained on how to operate the gauge, Mr.
Hathaway asked Mr. Mertens if it makes a difference if you have
a trained fire fighting staff or an untrained one. Mr. Mertens
said

"no," reminding Mr. Hathaway that "there are requirements

for fire department training." (R. 594, 11. 5-14)
Bench claimed that the code

requires

you to operate the

hydrant at a minimum of 20 psi because you could cavitate or
collapse the system.1

However, this

requirement

can't

be

found

in the UFC.
On page

41-42 of Cross-Appellant's

Brief, the cross-

appellant stated the following:
"If, as Mr. Mertens testified, that 20 PSI is normally an
accepted figure, regardless of the actual physics of when
a system collapses or cavitates, then Chief Bench was
justified in relying on the "normal accepted figure."

1.

See (R. 527, 1. 15 to 528, 1. 9);(R. 546, 1. 23 to 547, 1. 5)
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However, the cross-appellant should have finished what Mertens
said to understand if 20 PSI is necessary to keep a pumper from
cavitating or a system from collapsing.

The following is what

Mertens testified to concerning this matter:
Q. And do you agree that the . . minimum PSI that's
acceptable
under the UFC is 20 PSI in such a test? A. I
don't recall that the 1988 version has 20 PSI in it. It's
a normally
accepted
figure,
regardless of whether it's in
there. But if you look at the technical data behind it, it
also says that you can go down to 10 pounds.
And places do
it to jfive pounds.
But 20 pounds, to me, would be the
acceptable figure. If I could not get 2,750 off of here at
20 pounds, but I could at 15 pounds, I'd accept the
system.
Because the difference between 20 pounds with hydrants right
next to a building
is not going to make any difference
at
all. Because you're not going to loose that much
pressure
in your hose getting to the truck. Q. Would you accept
10?
A. Yes, J would. (R. 638, 11. 13 to 639 11. 4).
Furthermore, Mertens testified that maintaining 20

psi

residual pressure in the supply system doesn't have anything to
do with keeping pumpers from cavitating or the supply line from
collapsing if the pressure drops below

20 psi.

One reason that

20 psi residual pressure is used, is that it gives you enough
pressure to overcome all the hose that you connect to the hydrant
in order to get water to your truck and to prevent the pressure
dropping to low by the time you get to your truck.
designed to suck under negative pressure.

Pumpers are

Therefore, before a

pumper would cavitate, the inlet pressure would have to be
than

zero.

And before the pipes in the ground would ever

collapse, it would have to take substantially less
pounds

less

positive pressure.

than

zero

There's no reason why you couldn't
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drop your pressure down to 5 to 10 psi while pumping. (R. 569571) .
Tandy/ respondent's expert, said he did not know whether you
could go below 20 PSI residual pressure in an emergency to fight
a fire. He said that he was not an expert in this area. (R. 903
11. 10-19).
REGARDING FOOTNOTE #10
In

defense

to

cross-appellee's

charge that Bench lied

to the trial court, the cross-appellant said,
"This is another instance where Petitioner claims Chief
Bench lied to or tried to deceive the Court. Chief Bench
had used the line across the street to approve a permit for
a T-shirt shop, but did not want to depend on it for fire
protection for the Indian Village complex. The
evidence

before the court was that this shop was quite small and
would not have required the same amount of water flow or
pressure
to combat a fire as would the Indian
Village
complex, thus making it adequate for the fire protection of
the t-shirt shop but inadequate for Indian Village,
(emphasis added)(footnote 10).
However, the evidence does not show that the T-shirt shop was
quite small, but shows that the T-shirt
the Zion Park motel complex.

shop

was

attached to

The square footage of the Zion Park

complex requires 2,750 gpm water flow out of three hydrants, the
same hydrant requirements the Indian Village complex was required
to provide. Furthermore, the hydrant across the street water
flowed only 400 gpm,

(See Bench deposition Volume IV, Exhibit

30 (diagram of Zion Park Complex) attached hereto as Exhibit XXA,"
which was used at trial at R. 960-963), this is the hydrant
Bench said he would never use.

(R. 543-544).
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To try to save Bench's credibility the cross-appellant cited
R. 986-987 for footnote number 10, wherein among other things,
Hathaway asked Bench,
"Q. Is that [T-shirt shop] 12,500 square feet? A. It was
presented as — the plans that I reviewed were a small —
a small building.
Q. In fact, it's a few square feet? It's
built in between existing buildings, is it not? A. Uh-hh.

It was built

between

two existing

buildings.

The answers given by Bench are another example where Bench
deliberately lied to the trial court.

The T-shirt shop is not

a "small building," "built between two existing buildings" but
is a new building attached to two existing buildings making up
the Zion Park complex which has more than 11,600 square feet in
it and Bench knew this.

See

Bench deposition Volume IV, Exhibit

30 (diagram of Zion Park Complex) attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
C.

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER HAD FAILED
COMPLETELY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DECISION WAS BASED ON
ANY WRONGFUL CONDUCT, PASSION, PARTIALITY, OR FRAUD.
Bench's

actions may be overturned

if they were the

result of wrongful conduct, passion, partiality or fraud.
Even when the local officer's actions call for the exercise
of his discretion, if he exercises that discretion in an
extremely wrong or a flagrantly improper manner, his decision
is reviewable and reversible. "[T]he action of an officer in
a matter which calls for the exercise of his discretion or
judgment will not be reviewed . . . unless . . . such action

is shown to be extremely

wrong or flagrantly
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improper

and

unjust,

so that the decision can only be explained as the

result

of

caprice,

passion

or

partiality."

State

v.

Morehouse, 112 P. 169, 171 (Utah 1910)(emphasis added).

As

stated in another Utah Supreme Court opinion, although "an
official act may be quasi-judicial or discretionary, yet if
the discretion is qualified, and the refusal to perform the
act is merely capricious, arbitrary, or wrongful, the officer
may, nevertheless, be coerced by mandamus to do the act."
Utah Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bowman,
1911) (emphasis added).

113 P. 63, 65 (Utah

See also, Dillon v. Bd. Of Educ, 351

S.E.2d 58, 59 (W.Va. 1986) ("Mandamus will lie to control a
board of education in the exercise of its discretion upon a
showing of caprice, passion, partiality, fraud, arbitrary
conduct, some ulterior motive, or misapprehension of the
law.")(emphasis added).
Furthermore, a discretionary decision made in bad faith
also provides grounds to reverse the local official.

See

Chavez v. Sandia Corp., 555 P.2nd 699, 700 (N.M. 1976) (the
district

court properly

limited

its review to employers'

administrative boardf s decision to whether the decision "was made
in Jbad faith or was arbitrary or capricious." (emphasis added)
As stated above, fraud also provides ground to review
and reverse a local official's decision.
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See Bd. Of County

Commissioners v. Price, 385 P.2d 479, 482 (Okl. 1963)(where
the local officer acts arbitrarily "or fraudulently, a writ
of mandamus may be issued to require the performance of his
duty")(emphasis added).

See also, Mobile Oil Corp. v.

McHenry, 200 Kan. 211, 436 P.2d 982, 996 (1968) (judicial
interference is warranted when there is "fraud, corruption,
and conduct so oppressive, arbitrary, or capricious as to
amount to fraud . . . and the courts have power to relieve
against all consequential injuries); Anderson v. Dunn, 180
Kan. 811, 308 P.2d 154, 157 (1957)(when a public official's
actions are tainted with fraud, or are so "capricious,
arbitrary, or oppressive as to amount to constructive fraud,
then the only avenue open to the aggrieved party is through
some extraordinary

legal

remedy such as mandamus. ")(emphasis

added).
Finally, if "there has been such an abuse of discretion
as to amount to no exercise of discretion at all, mandamus
will lie to compel the proper exercise of powers granted."
Crain v. Dept. Of Health & Environmental Sciences, 582 P.2d
332, 334 (Mont. 1978).
In Petitioner Brief, ARGUMENT, ISSUE II, are listed seven
instances wherein Bench's actions as described, are suspect
under virtually every category described above, including
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lying. Thus, the very basis for Bench's subsequent decision
if any, that the Indian Villages system was not safe for
adequate fire fighting capabilities is highly suspect.
D.

CROSS-APPELLANT'S ISSUE II. D. DOES NOT LIST ANY
EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT THAT HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN ADDRESSED
THAT WOULD SUPPORT THE COURTS FINDINGS COMPLAINED OF, SO
NO FURTHER ANSWER IS WARRANTED.

E.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING CERTAIN PIECES OF
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.
1.

CROSS-APPELLEE ACCEPTS CROSS-APPELLANT'S STANDARD
EMPLOYED BY THE COURTS IN DETERMINING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE.

2.

RICK ROSENBERG'S TESTIMONY WAS EXCLUDED BY THE
COURT.

On page

48 of Cross-Appellant's

Brief, the cross-

appellant said the following:
"Mr. Mertens testified that he had seen the results from
Mr. Rosenberg's simulation that such test showed it
might be possible to get 1,500 GPM from hydrant three
and based on these numbers and tests, the system was
safe. 00566-00568. Even though Mr. Rosenberg himself
did not testify to the results of the computer
simulation, that information was before the Court. Mr.
Rosenberg's testimony would have been duplicative. As
Mr. Rosenberg's reports and the data contained were
before the Court below, notwithstanding the Court's
exclusion of Mr. Rosenberg, the Petitioner cannot argue
that a different result would be obtained had Rosenberg
testified.
Hence, no substantial right has been
affected in the Court's exclusion."
However, the facts do not support these statements and
conclusions for the following reason:
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The only computer simulated

tests

that Mr. Mertens said

he had seen are the following:
(1)

Two tests that showed fire hydrant #3 flowed more than
1,500 gpm, and fire hydrant #2 flowed about 1,800 gpm,
at 20 PSI, when each was flowing individually. (R.
560, 1. 25 to 561, 1. 5) and,

(2)

one test that showed with fire hydrant #1 closed, and
both fire hydrants #2 and #3 flowing, fire hydrant #3
would water flow more than 800 g.p.m. and fire hydrant
#2 would flow about 900 g.p.m. (R. 574, 1. 10 to 575,
1. 16) .

However, there was three other computer simulated water flow
tests that Mr. Mertens did not see or testify about created on
September 11, 1995, by Mr. Rosenberg that were made in an effort
to duplicate the November 1, 1991, test results as Bench recorded
them in him letter dated December 10, 1991. (R. 63).
Mr. Mertens testimony was rebutted by Bench's testimony. (R.
717, 11. 8-12).

However, it is hard to impeach or argue with

computer generated test results.

If Mr. Rosenberg had been

allowed to testify, he would have placed the various computer
simulated test readouts he had created into evidence.

Without

Rosenberg to lay the foundation for the computer readouts, they
could not have been placed into evidence.
Mr.

Rosenberg's

testimony

and

the

computer

readouts

certainly would not have been duplicative as argued by crossappellant.

For example, Rosenberg would have testified as to

how and why his computer could duplicate Bench's field test
conducted on November 1, 1991, and various other scenarios.
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He

would have testified as to the kind of software program he used
and to its margin of accuracy, in gallons per minute.
Rosenberg's testimony and the simulated water flow test were
critical to prove Bench's claim, that hydrant #2 and #3 could not
water flow more than 1,100 gpm with hydrant #1 closed, was not
based on a rational basis, and that his readings taken during
the November 1, 1991, test had been falsified.

This information

was not before the court as argued by the cross-appellant.
On

page

47

of

Cross-Appellant's

Brief,

the

cross-

appellant said the following:
"In its brief, Petitioner asserts for the first time that
Mr. Rosenberg's testimony was offered to show that then
Chief Bench had falsified the results of the November 1,
1991, test. Upon review of the record, however, it is clear
that this proffer was never made. Petitioner now asserts
that Mr. Rosenberg's testimony would have established an
element of fraud on then Chief Bench's part. . . Moreover,
virtually all the witnesses who testified, including
Petitioner's expert, Mr. Mertens, testified that the numbers
and calculations in Al Bench's December flow test report
were correct. Petitioner's assertions that the results have
in some way been falsified are directly contrary to the
evidence presented to the Court." (emphasis added).
However, the

facts do not

support

these

statements

and

conclusions for the following reason:
A.

PETITIONER DID IN FACT OFFER MR. ROSENBERG'S
TESTIMONY TO SHOW THAT BENCH FALSIFIED HIS NOVEMBER
1, 1991, TEST EQUIPMENT READINGS.

The following is taken from the record to show that the
cross-appellee did in fact offer Rosenberg's testimony to
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show that Bench had falsified the

November 1, 1991, Test

Equipment Readings:
"MULLEN: Judge, there is one issue. And I want to alert
the Court to it right now.
I think that Mr. Tandy
reopened the door to the computer expert . . . COURT: .
. I don't think that the door's been opened to any
additional evidence regarding the computer simulations.
It seems to me we're still dealing with the information
that was available to the chief on the day he made his
decision. MULLEN: Judge, that's what we are saying.
We're going to prove the information available to him
could not have been what he put here, through that
computer simulation. COURT: How are you going to do
that? MULLEN: Because the simulation will show that if
you put those figures in [and] the 43 PSI, you don't get
those flows. COURT: But he didn't have the computer
simulation.
MULLEN: Well, Judge, it goes to his
credibility as to what he said he measured after he put
the gauge on it. COURT: Is there an issue as to what
the gauge shows? MULLEN: Yes. . . HATHAWAY: The . .
plaintiff has . . rested, as I see, first. COURT:
That's true. HATHAWAY: And there is . . . no evidence
before the Court rebutting those figures. There is no
evidence that those figures were not correct. COURT:
Well, the plaintiff has rested, but only after I refused
to let . . their engineer testify as to the computer
simulation. HATHAWAY: There's no further evidence, Your
Honor, . . whatsoever that those numbers are inaccurate,
or that the gauges are misread, or that . . the
information gathered was wrong.
There's been no
evidence of that. MULLEN: Well, Your Honor, we would
proffer that our simulation will show that. And that's
what we proffered when we tried to get him on. (R. 919,
1. 23 to 922. 1. 23) .
B.

THE COMPUTER SIMULATED TESTS THAT WERE REJECTED AS NOT
RELEVANT WOULD HAVE PROVEN THAT BENCH DID NOT USE HIS
TEST EQUIPMENT READINGS THAT WAS READ DURING THE
NOVEMBER 1, 1991, WATER FLOW TEST TO CALCULATE THE
TEST RESULTS AS REPORTED IN HIS LETTER DATED
DECEMBER 10, 1991.
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The computer

simulated tests that were rejected as not

relevant would have proven that Bench did not use his test
equipment
1991,

readings that were read during the November

water

reported

in

flow
his

test

to

letter

calculate
dated

the

December

test
10,

results
1991.

1,
as

This

conclusion is based on the following facts.
(1)

The test equipment readings Bench claimed he
during the test are as follows:

read

a.

Hydrant #1 read 30 psi on the pitot gauge on each
of the two ports which were open.

b.

Hydrant #2 read 43 psi on the pressure gauge.

c.

Hydrant #3 read 6 psi on the pitot gauge on one
of the ports which was open.

(R. Ill, D-l).
(2)

Bench took the test equipment reading he claimed he
read and computed those readings into gallons per
minute and reported those results in his letter dated
December 10, 1991. (R. 63). The reported results are
as follows.
a.

Hydrant #1 flowed 2,120 gpm from two ports

b.

Hydrant #2 recorded 43 psi residual pressure.

c.

Hydrant #3 flowed 820 gpm from one port.

(3)

Rosenberg took two of the three reported readings in
fact (2) above, and inputted those readings into his
software program.
Then the computer generated what
the third reading should have been on a simulated flow
test readout.

(4)

Rosenberg created three computer simulated tests to
prove that regardless of which two readings reported
by Bench were imputed into the computer the other
reading generated by the computer was far from the
reading reported by Bench, far outside the software's
margin of error.
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(5)

After Rosenberg adjusting for the margin of accuracy
for both the computer test and the field test, the two
test results should have been very close.
However
they were so far apart that it was impossible for the
results as Bench reported in his letter dated December
10, 1991, to have come from his test equipment
readings he claimed he read on November 1, 1991.

(6)

Fact number (3), (4), and (5) above, would have been
established by Rosenberg's rejected testimony and
readouts.

Bench

falsified

the

results

of

the

water

flow

tests

conducted on July 2, July 12, and October 16, 1991, to two Boards
of Appeals.

See Appellant's Brief, ISSUE II, f$ C and D) .

The

appellant proffered the testimony of Rosenberg to show among
other things that the results of the flow test conducted on
November 1, 1991, was also falsified.

The testimony would have

shown that the results of the test as reported by Bench were
different than what was recorded on the test equipment.
Therefore, considering the above facts there is a reasonable
likelihood

a

different

result

would

have

been

reached

if

Rosenberg's testimony and his computer simulated water flow test
readouts had been placed into evidence.
3.

THE COURT ERRED BY SUSTAINING AN OBJECTION TO
A QUESTION ASKED BENCH, WHETHER IT WAS TRUE
THAT IN MARCH 1991, AT A FIRE BOARD MEETING,
HE HAD AGREED THAT THE MINIMUM FLOW NEEDED FOR
THE TWO HYDRANTS IN BACK WOULD BE 550 GPM.

In a letter dated January 23, 1991, Elder ordered the
Fire District to
if the
hydrant

test

hydrants

water flow from hydrant
#2 was

#2

and

#3

#3 was insignificant while

flowing, and if they found
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to determine

the

flow of

hydrant

#3 was insignificant the petitioner would have to

"loop" its system. Supra.

However, the letter did not state

what the minimum hydrant #3 had to water flow before its flow
was acceptable.
In discovery the petitioner had been furnished an audio
tape of the March 1991 Fire Board meeting.

Mullen

asked

Bench, if it wasn't true that at this meeting, there had been
a

minimum

of

550

g.p.m.,

hydrants needed to flow?

agreed

to

which

the

back

two

This question was objected to as

not being relevant and the objection was sustained.

(R. 728,

1. 8 to 729, 1. 14) .
Concerning

this

matter,

on

page

48-49

of

Cross-

Appellant's Brief, cross-appellant argued,
"Had evidence been admitted that a discussion regarding
the minimum flow for the back two hydrants had taken
place at the March 1991 Fire Board Meeting, such
evidence would still not be relevant.
Even giving
Petitioner the benefit of the doubt that such a
discussion took place, such discussion, months earlier,

had no bearing
on the test administered
and
evidence
'gathered on November l, 1991 or the conclusions
reach as
stated
in the December m, lyyi,
letter.™
(emphasis
added).
However,

this

argument

is

flawed

for

the

following

reasons:
(1)

P-81 was entered into evidence over the objection
of Hathaway that it was not relevant. Because, it
was a July 2, 1991, letter that reported the
results of the water flow test conducted by John
Elder on July 2, 1991, which the December 10, 1991,
letter referenced in fact (4), below. (R. 497499)(R. Ill P-81).

(2)

P-92 was entered into evidence over the objection
of Hathaway that it was not relevant. Because, it
was a July 13, 1991, letter that gave the results
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of the water flow test conducted by Bench on July
12, 1991, which the December 10, 1991, letter
referenced in fact (4), below. (R. 506-508) (R. Ill
P-92).
(3)

P-209 was entered into evidence, because, it
contained the results of the
October 16, 1991,
water flow test, which the December 10, 1991,
letter referenced in fact (4), below. (R. 721722)(R. 112 P-209).

(4) One of the conclusions reached by Bench and stated
in the December 10, 1991, letter was, "Only 1,090
gpm is available to the #2 and #3 hydrants on the
dead end 6" line . . This reinforces the previous
tests conducted by John Elder and myself which
showed poor fire flow from those hydrants.
The
system is not adequate for safe fire fighting
capabilities." (R. 63).
(5)

In all four water flow tests (see facts (1), (2),
(3), and (4) above) the water flow from hydrants
#2 and/or #3 exceeded 550 gpm, by more than 50%.
See Petitioner's Brief, Statement of Facts II 2073T

If

at trial it had been established that Bench and the

Fire Board had agreed that 550 gpm would be the minimum water
flow hydrant #3 needed to flow, while hydrant #2 was flowing,
for acceptable water flow, there is reasonable likelihood a
different result would have been reached.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the petitioner requests
this Court to find that the Fifth District Court did not err
in denying Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and to reverse the
Order of Dismissal dated December 12, 1995, and hold that the
respondent ajbused his

discretion

when he concluded that the

results of the water flow test conducted on November 1, 1991,
showed that the water flow from petitioner's hydrants #2 and
#3 was not adequate for safe fire fighting capabilities, or
order a new trial.
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DATED this _^~~"day of June 1996.

Terry west
The attorney for
Petitioner/Appellant
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foregoing
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PETITIONER-APPELLANT AND BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE to the
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Benson L. Hathaway
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
Attorney for Fire District Defendants
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ry West

46

Exhibit A

t£-

\
- ^

- J Z ^ -^-

^

4

•^

;; o

u no

IS

3s-9/
*//-.

K

xT/r/i

^rAC'

fi/fo-f^l

^
^

£7$-0 ~£ooj G PM

V

Y
ir-

0'
<4 /J./Jsast-f- &/

1fa&GPM

/S&-

